Mathematics without numbers nor figures!
When
more fundamental elements than numbers arise.
From mathematics to mathematic,
When mathematics become a real language,
not
a simple collection of theories
Legend:
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ZFC axioms |
Logics formula |
Logics matrices |
Problematic sets |
Naive theory demonstrations |
ZFC demonstrations |
Digressions |
Here my introduction to the Zermelo-Fraenkel
axiomatic set theory. This is a personal arrangement. Maybe will you experiment
this agreeable sensation of being fit out to start to explore strange countries
and to build serious foundations to mathematics.
This is an arrangement that focuses on the
paradoxes contained in the naïve set theory, the iterative conception of set.
The fact that what we have naïvely in mind when we think about sets, closed
entity, is really dynamical, expansive. The term “set” itself, is it not
moving, fuzzy? On the other hand, it appears that an ontology cannot be
satisfied with the restrictions established by the ZFC axiomatic.
Material: numbers and letters (sounds and fruit
of observations);
Fundamental relations: relations
Tools/equipment: axioms
L º Í, Î, =, @, Ù, Ú, Ø, ®, Û, ", $, #, ( , ), variables (x, y, z...),…
A Formula is a sentence written in
the language L .
If j, y are formula, then j Ú y, j Ù y, Øj, j ® y, j « y, "x j, $y y are formula.
Linked variables are quantified: "x, $y
Parameters: non quantified/free
variables: "x
$y x Î z Ù z Î y º j
In this formula j, z is a parameter, we cannot determine its
truth.
Ø"x j(x,…) º $x Øj(x,…)
Ø$x j(x,…) º "x Øj(x,…)
j(a, b, c) means that the set of the free
variables of j is a part of {a, b, c}. Anything
with 2 variables can be with 3 or more variables: x² + 3y² + 0z²
sentence = complete phrase º formula without parameters. / so a sentence asserts something, / it
can be true or false
G = theory = collection/list of sentences
Theorem of G =
sentence s such that from G, one deduces s: G — s
Let’s start with the Null/Empty set:
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$y "x xÎy Û x ¹ x |
x ¹ x is a formula but any other impossible
equality would function :
x = Æ Ù x = ¥
0 = 1
As no element can satisfy this
condition/formula, the set y contains no element!
Y = {x | x ¹ x}
y = {} or Æ
Why is it so? In virtue of the principles of
non-contradiction and excluded-middle:
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Ø(p Ù Øp) º p Ú Øp |
They have the same conditions of satisfaction:
Ø(p Ù Øp) º Ø(p) Ú Ø(Øp)
º
Øp
Ú p
º
p Ú Øp
p Ú Øp º Ø(Øp Ù p)
º Ø(p Ù Øp)
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p |
q |
p Ù q |
- (p Ù q) |
-p Ú -q |
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0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
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0 |
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0 |
1 |
1 |
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1 |
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1 |
0 |
0 |
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1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
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p |
-p |
p Ù -p |
p Ù -p |
- (p Ù -p) |
p Ú -p |
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0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
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1 |
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0 |
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Normally, “p Ù -p” is true when the two
propositions are true only; but here, the situation where they are both false
is equivalent by virtue of the commutativity of the connector “Ù”:
p Ù -p º -p Ù p
In the same way, the situations where one is
true and the other false can be reduced to one case.
Of course, we work in first order
logic. And it is question here of the inclusive OR
(exclusive OR = XOR)
If we consider cases of
presupposition, we can be tempted to establish a semantic/non-classical
negation
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[Ø(p Ù Øp) º p Ú Øp] º [Ø(p Ù Øp) « p Ú Øp] « [Ø(p Ù Øp) º p Ú Øp] {[Ø(p Ù Øp) º p Ú Øp] º [Ø(p Ù Øp) « p Ú Øp]} « {[Ø(p Ù Øp) º p Ú Øp] « [Ø(p Ù Øp) « p Ú Øp]} there is an inevitable disequilibria in the occurrences of the “equivalence”
operators |
S Ç Æ = Æ
S È Æ = S
Æ Ç {Æ} = Æ
Æ È {Æ} = {Æ}
Æ Î {Æ}
Really, the null set is the only
non-set object admitted in the axiomatic.
No axiom of unconditional existence!
But let’s come back to the formula,
i.e. a sentence that can be determined true or false because it does not
contain parameters, free variables:
"x x Î {x | F(x)}º F(x)
with F(x) =
Now, in which measure is it
legitimate to use such formula to define a set, were it by default? Is the null
set more legitimate than the set of all sets? On the other hand, why would it less
legitimate than “0”?
Now the Infinite set :
From one extreme, Æ
to
another one ¥
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$x (Æ Î x Ù "y (y Î x Þ {y}Îx)) |
Thanks to the existence of the null set, it is
possible to build an infinite set. It was funny to begin this tutorial with
these seemingly two opposite sets!
0 = Æ 1 = {Æ}
2 = {Æ, {Æ}} 3 =
{Æ, {Æ}, {{Æ}}}…
or
0 = {}
1 = {{}} 2 = {{}, {{}}} 3 = {{}, {{}}, {{{}}}}…
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x = {Æ, {Æ}, {{Æ}}…} º x = {{}, {{}}, {{{}}}…} |
This is an illustration of the Induction principle.
You show that the formula is correct for a minimal element, in general 0. After
that you try to establish that if it is true for x, it must be true for x + 1.
Thanks to the replacement axiom scheme:
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"u "v "w ((F(u, v) « F(u, w)) ® v = w)) ® "x $y "v (v Î y « $u u Î x Ù F(u, v)) |
we can build the Naturals :
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$x (Æ Î x Ù "y (y Î x Þ y È {y}Îx)) |
This is the translation of integers in set
theory by Von Neumann, using the recursive algorithm:
0 := Æ
N + 1 := N È {N}
Zero, the
smallest von Neumann integer, is defined as the empty set. The von Neumann
integer N is
defined as the finite set with N elements which are the von Neumann integers 0 to N-1.
0 := Æ
1 := 0 È {0} = {Æ}
2 := 1 È {1} = {0, 1} = {Æ, {Æ}}
3 := 2 È {2} = {0, 1, 2} = {Æ, {Æ}, {Æ, {Æ}}}…
.
.
.
N + 1 := N È {N} = {0, 1, 2,…, N} = {Æ, {Æ}, {Æ, {Æ}},…,
{Æ, {Æ}},
{Æ, {Æ}, {Æ, {Æ}}}…}}…
0 :=
{}
1 =
{{}}
2 = {{},
{{}}}
3 = {{},
{{}}, {{}, {{}}}}
.
.
.
N+ 1 = {{},
{{}}, {{}, {{}}},…, {{}, {{}}}, {{},
{{}}, {{}, {{}}}}…}}…
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x = {Æ, {Æ}, {Æ, {Æ}}…} º x =
{{}, {{}}, {{}, {{}}}…} |
von Neumann integers is infinite but
every of its element N is finite.
The von Neumann integer transcription
grows exponentially, for N>0 it has 5*2N-1-1 characters (braces and commas).

Of course, this representation doesn’t
make sense, since N is infinite! This is the paradox of set theory.
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Axiom of foundation or regularity:
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$x F(x) ® $x F(x) Ù "y Ø(F(y) ® y Î x) |
or
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$x F(x) ® $x F(x) Ù Ø($y F(y) Ù y Î x) |
This axiom allows to avoid the
circular inclusions (Heinlein auto generation)
like:
x
Î y Ù
y Î z Ù
z Î x
and infinitely descending chains of
sets :
… x3 Î x2 Î x1 Î x0
In other words, increasing infinite allowed,
descending infinite excluded.
So once again, we see the limits of
this axiom in the frame of a universal ontology
We consider now the problematic
sets.
sets that does not contain
themselves
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$y "x xÎy Û x Ï x |
y = {x | x Ï x}
With the short comprehension
axiom,
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$y "x xÎy Û F(x) |
that gives :
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x Î y º x Ï x |
If we instantiate y for x, we
have :
y Î y º y Ï y
which is, of course, absurd !
" x x Î {x | x Î y Þ x È {x}Î y} º F(x)
Here, the separation axiom
scheme will be useful, we can save:
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" |
Indeed we have now :
z Î y Û zÎ x Ù z Ï z
which gives, with the instantiation
of y for z :
(y Î y Û yÎ x Ù y Ï y)
the condition to keep the validity
of the axiom – otherwise an axiom would be false - is to consider that :
y Ï x Ù y Ï y
which shows that, for any set, there
is something not contained by it ;
so there is no set of all sets !
with Zermelo, this axiom has two
conditions to build sets on the basis of a property:
-
to
start from an existing set
-
well-defined
property
as this second condition itself is
not “well-defined”, Skolem will precise that a property is well-defined if:
-
it is expressed
in a first-order predicate calculus language
-
it
uses logical constants
-
it
uses the two predicate symbols = and Î only.
Separation axiom scheme:
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" |
" x x Î {x | F(x)} º j(x)
" x x Î {x | F(x)} º F(x)
" x x Î {x | x Î y Þ x È {x}Î y} º F(x)
Replacement axiom scheme:
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"u "v "w ((F(u, v) « F(u, w)) ® v = w)) ® "x $y "v (v Î y « $u u Î x Ù F(u, v)) |
The open sentence F(u, v) is a functional
condition, a function that relates each member in set u to a unique member in
set v.
It is necessary to prove the
existence of a limit
of the increasing
series of transfinite cardinals (
) º {
: i Î N}
Axiom of extensionality:
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"x "y "z ((z Î x « z Î y) ® x = y) |
Sets are uniquely defined by their
members. There cannot be two different sets that have the same elements. As the
identity of sets is treated extensionally and not intentionally, two different
set definitions can lead to identical sets.
The notions of “set”, “element” and
“membership” are indissociable!
Note that the converse,
x = y ® "x "y "z ((z Î x « z Î y)
is an axiom of the predicate
calculus. Hence we have,
x = y « "x "y "z ((z Î x « z Î y)
Therefore the Axiom of
Extensionality expresses the most fundamental notion of a set: a set is
determined by its elements. This is the reason why this axiom is ordinarily the
introductive axiom of the theory. But if there is an infinity of sets with one
or more members, there is “only one” null set!
Where the use of the null set as
fundamental element is justified!
Two examples of demonstration:
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Let A = {0, 1}, let B =
{1, 0} Let’s show that A = B |
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1) "x "y ("z (z Î x « z Î y) ® x = y) / Axiom or "x "y ("z (z Î x º z Î y) ® x = y) Axiom 2)
x =
A, y = B / We have set A and
set B 3)
"z (z Î A « z Î B) ® A = B / 1, 2 Instantiation 4)
0 Î A º 0 Î B / set definition of A, B 5)
1 Î A º 1 Î B / set definition of A, B 6) "z (z Î A « z Î B) / 4, 5 7)
A =
B / Modus ponens |
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Let A = {0, 0}, let B =
{0} Let’s show that A = B |
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1) "x "y ("z (z Î x « z Î y) ® x = y) / Axiom or "x "y ("z (z Î x º z Î y) ® x = y) Axiom 2)
x =
A, y = B / We have set A and
set B 3)
"z (z Î A « z Î B) ® A = B / 1, 2 Instantiation 4)
Let’s
01 stand for “the first element” in A, and 02 stand for
“the second element” in A 5)
01
Î A º 0 Î A º 0 Î B /
set definition of A, B 6)
02
Î A º 0 Î A º 0 Î B /
set definition of A, B 7)
"z (z Î A º z Î B) /
from 5, 6 8)
A =
B / Modus
ponens |
The principle of “anti-symmetry”
leads to the same result:
Let A = {0, 1}, let B =
{1, 0}
A Í B Ù B Í A Þ A = B
Since Í ® Ì, we can put a higher condition:
A Ì B Ù B Ì A Þ A = B
In the same way, we have:
A £ B Ù B £ A Þ A = B
and
A < B Ù B < A Þ A = B
As the order of the elements of a set
has no importance, it is necessary to elaborate a definition of ordered
elements.
A collection of elements in which
multiplicity but not order is relevant is called a multi-set.
As for the order, it is taken into
account in this way:
(x, y) ¹ (y, x)
Indeed, by definition,
(x, y) = {{x}, {x, y}}
(y, x) = {{y}, {x, y}}
let’s prove that (x, y)
≠ (y, x) as long as x is different of y;
(x, y) = {{x}, {x, y}}
(y, x) = {{y}, {x, y}}
If {x, y} is equal to
{x, y},
{x} is really different of
{y} by hypothesis,
otherwise, by axiom of
extensionality, we would have a
singleton {x} or {y]
in place of {x, y},
hence (x, y) is really
different of (y, x)
if we make a demonstration in a
constructive way, we have
(x, y) = (x’, y’) Iff x = x’ & y = y’
{{x}, {x, y}} = {{x’}, {x’, y’}} º ({{x} = {x’} Ú {x’, y’}} Ù {x, y} = {x’} Ú {x’, y’}}
{x, {x, y}} = {x’, {x’, y’}}
º ({x} = {x’} Ù {x, y} = {x’, y’}) Ú ({x} = {x’, y’} Ú {x, y} = {x’})
º ({x} = {x’} Ù {x, y} = {x’, y’})
º (x = x’ Ù y = y’) by Axiom of Extensionality
Since we are dealing with “orders”,
let’s consider triplets, quadruplets, n-uplets.
(x, y, z) = (x, (y, z))
(x, (y, z)) = {x, {x, {y, {y, z}}}
(x,
y, z) = {{x}, {x, y}, {x, y, z}}
(a1, a2, a3,
…, an) = (a1, (a2, a3, …, an))
= (a1, (a2, (a3, …, an))) = (a1,
(a2, (a3, (…, an))))
We immediately see the limits of the
axiom of extensionality in the frame of an high-level ontology. What does mean
“to have the same elements”?
This is a way of erasing the time
factor.
We can introduce a relativity scale
(// Russell types?); referential
A set has the dimension of its
elements (space-time matter continuum)
Axiom of the pairs:
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"x "y $z "t (t Î z « t = x Ú t = y) or "x "y $z "t (t Î z º t = x Ú t = y) |
From sets x and y, one can build {x,
y}, and from that, recursively, the sets
{x, {x, y}}, {y, {x, y}}…
One can also build {x, x} that, by virtue
of the principle of extensionality, is reduced to the singleton {x}.
If x = Æ º x = {}, we have {{}}, and by
recursivity, {{{…}}}.
The way to build sets as big as one
wants.
Axiom of the parts or Power axiom :
Divergent
infinites.
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"x $y "z (z Î y « "u u Î z ® z Î x) |
A way of expressing the inclusion,
the potentiality
The road to differences in
cardinality between infinite sets!
Indeed, we will make the
demonstration that the elements of a set and the elements of the set of its parts cannot be made in
bijection.
Only constructive axiom with the
axiom of the pair.
If we start from the null set, we
can build the singleton:
Ã(Æ) = {Æ}
by recursivity:
Ã({Æ}) = {Æ, {Æ}}
Ã({Æ, {Æ}}) = {Æ, {Æ}, {{Æ}}, {Æ, {Æ}}}
If #X = n, then #Ã(X) = 2n
The axiom of the parts allows, as
that of the pairs, to build infinitely big sets.
In geometry, the line L is a set of
points and the set L is of the lines of a plane p is a set of sets.
If m is a point of the plane p and D a line getting over m, we have:
m Î p
m Î L L Í p
L Î L
It is the
demonstration that it will function because it has to function!
If E has n elements, then Ã(E) has 2n elements.
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Demonstration: by recurrence on
n. Be P the above property to
demonstrate. P(0) is true because then E = Æ and Ã(Æ) = {Æ} contains 1 element. Let’s suppose that P(n) is true;
be then E with n + 1 element; Be a one of these elements that
we fix. We can divide P(E) in two parts: parts of E that contain a parts of E that does not contain
a; let’s compute the number of
elements of each of these parts; be A the parts of E that
does not contain a be B the parts of E that
contain a We have a bijection between A
and Ã(E-{a}) defined by a(a) = a for each A
Î A. So these two sets
have the same number of elements; Since E – {a} has n elements,
since P(n) is true, the cardinality of A is 2n. We also have a bijection between B and Ã(E-{a}) defined by b(b) = B – {a}. So B has 2n
elements too. So Ã(E) has 2n
+ 2n elements, i.e. 2n + 1 elements. QED |
If n = 3, Ã(3) = 8
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is it a legitimate translation of:

Axiom of union:
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"x $y "z (z Î y « $u u Î x Ù z Î u) |
If we apply the axiom of union to the
Power set, we find the initial set w. Really, as revealed by the
Burali-Forti paradox, w cannot be a set; it is a class!
Axiom of simplification in the same
way as that of extensionality
Burali-Forti paradox:
w cannot be a set, because it would be
indexed by a type and would have to contain itself, because the definition of
the ordinals
construction of ordinals each
ordinal is constituted of its predecessors
maximal element
xg = f(strict Maj.{xb½b < g})
induction principle
how do the axioms play a role in the
following developments?
Be a function f : E ® F
f is injective if we have
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f(x) = f(y) Þ x = y |
Of course, if f is a function,
x = y Þ f(x) = f(y)
is always true, which means that the graph is functional. So, for an
injective application,
we have:
x = y Û f(x) = f(y)
f is surjective if f(E) = F.
It means that any element of F can
be written f(x) with x Î E.
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f is surjective Û "y Î F $x Î E ½y = f(x) |
Bijection: f is bijective if it is both
injective and surjective
Bijection Þ Injection (max. bij.)
Bijection Þ Surjection (min. bij.)
Injection: each element of target set
has at most 1 antecedent in source set; or each element of source set is the
only antecedent of an element of target set when it is an antecedent. Target
set is at least as big as source set.
Surjection: each element of target
set has at least 1 antecedent in source set; or each element of source set is
the only antecedent of an element of target set when it is an antecedent.
Target set is at least as big as source set.
Be A(dom) and B(image)
Surjection: either B contains as many
elements as A,and we have a bijection; either B contains more elements than A.
To have a proper identity, some elements of B have to have more than one
antecedent in A; but then j: A ® B is no more injective, which
admits only one or 0 antecedent for each b Î B in A.
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Ø (À # Ã(À)) |
Transfinites: the institutionalisation of paradoxes in mathematics.
Set is infinitely far from infinite.
That doesn’t prevent set and infinite to be very together.
Demonstration:
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Ã(N) is infinite since we have an injection
of N in Ã(N): n ® {n}; / indeed, N Ì RÃ(N) consequently,
it’s not a finite set. Now, we
have to show that there is no bijection between N and P(N). Be j: N® Ã(N); let’s show that j cannot be a bijection. / there is an
injection of N in Ã(N) º j: N® Ã(N) º n ® {n} º j(n) = {n} Be A = {n
Î N | n Ï j(n)}. Let’s
suppose there exists a Î N such that j(a) = A; if a Î A, according to the definition of A, a Ï j(a) = A; this is not possible; if a Ï A, since A = j(a), a Ïj(a), so, by definition of A, a Î A, which is not possible either;
consequently, that means that a doesn’t exist and that j is not surjective, thus not bijective. /
since j is injective, to show that it is
not bijective, it is necessary to show that it is not surjective. |
/ If A $, there must be free n in N and A must be in Ã(N) since it is constituted of n only; A is
obligatory a part of N.
/ If a doesn’t exist, A = j(a) doesn’t exist either, and there is no n Î N such that n Ï j(n), and there is no possible surjection
between n and Ã(N) because of the lack of free
elements in N.
It seems to be counter-intuitive
that A doesn’t exist because we can have, for example,,
![]()
/ Since N Î Ã(N), if we make a bijection between
N and N in j: N® Ã(N), we cannot use N for another
bijection. If we make a bijection
/ between N and N + (x, y) , one
cannot use N for another bijection. The problem is that there is an infinity of
additional sets which we can make N in
/ correspondance with. So one cannot
begin to attribute a n to all the parts/sets of Ã(N).
/ If there are n Î N such that n Ï j(n), these n constituting the set A,
they could be used for a surhection between N and Ã(N). There must be enough elements in N such
that each element of Ã(N) has at least one specific
antecedent.

of course, N and Ã(N) are infinite, even in different ways:
#N = À0
#Ã(N) =
= À1

Complementary demonstration of the
unaccountability of Ã(E) that will be useful to establish
that R is not countable.
Proposition: no injection from Ã(E) in N.
Demonstration:
|
Be w: Ã(N) ® N. Let’s show it is not
injective. We define
A = {n Î N|"E ÎÃ(N), if nÎ E, then w(E) ¹ n}. / the formula says that N
must be as big as Ã(N) in order to have unused n in
N. -w(a) Ï A; indeed, if w(a) Î A (thus in N), then "E ÎÃ(N), if w(a) Î E, then w(E) ¹ w(A); since we suppose ¹ w w(A) Î A, we can have E = A,
consequently w(A) ¹ w(A); consequently, w(A) Ï A. From an
other point of view, the image of E must be different of the elements of E;
thus different of w(A), which is an element of E. Now, A is a E,
then, thus w(E) ¹ w(E). From the
definition of A, w(A) Ï A means that $ E ÎÃ(N) | w(A) Î E Ù w(A) = w(E). Thus we
have w(A) = w(E), though A ¹ E since w(A) Ï A Ù w(A) Î E; so w is not injective. |
Remark:
This demonstration would be
acceptable for any set X, so there is no injection from Ã(X) in X.
|
"E ÎÃ(N) n Î e Þ w(E) ¹ n Þ n Î N n Î E Ùw(E) ¹ n Þ n Î N - (n Î N) Þ - (n Î E Ù w(E) ¹ n) n Ï N Þ -"E ÎÃ(N) (n Î E Ù w(E) ¹ n) n Ï N Þ ($E ÎÃ(N) (n Î E Ù w(E) = n)) Ú ($E ÎÃ(N) (n Ï E Ù w(E) ¹ n)) |
and we consider w(A) Î E, so
Target set bigger than N? This is not
a problem if we can make a finite choice of elements that allows a recursive
process in the correspondence with the naturals. This is the case with Q but
not with Ã(N).
Nevertheless there is a difference
between Ã(E) and R, even if they have the
same cardinality, because Ã(E) allows a choice, even though
infinite, while R doesn’t even allow to select a first element.
|
w: Ã(N) ® N ¹ inj. º j: N ® Ã(N) ¹ surj. |
Thus by recursivity, P(n) is true
for any n Î N.
ÁÃ
Î ® Ì
Í (inclusion) is the membership in a large
sense, i.e. real and potential
Axiom of choice well-ordering
principle Zorn lemma are equivalent
Axiom of choice º well-ordering principle º Zorn lemma
well-ordering principle = total order on a set E with the property
that every non empty subset of E has a least element in this ordering. The set
E with the well-order is then called a
standard ordering of natural
numbers, yes, but standard ordering of integers and positive real numbers, no!
well-ordered set.
A total order has the
following properties:
-
Reflexivity:
E £ E
-
Anti-symmetry:
E £ F Ù F £ E
Û E = F
-
Transitivity:
E £ F Ù F £ G Þ E £ G
-
Totalness: E £ F or F £ E
Theorems implying the axiom of
choice are non-constructive, i.e. mathematical proofs that purport to
demonstrate the existence of something, but not how to construct it! Frequent
use of contraposition.
Banach-Tarski paradox
By use of the axiom of choice, cut a solid ball in 3-dimensional space into
a finite number of pieces, re-assemble the
pieces to get two balls, both of equal size to the first and using only
rotation and translation, moving the pieces and reassemble them into two balls
of the same radius as the original.
Axiom of choice:
If set x is constituted of non empty
subsets disjoined two to two, there exists at least one set y that contains
exactly one element of each of the subsets of x.
|
"X $f fct.: X ® ÈX |"tÎ X/{0} f(t) Î t |
f defined on X such that for each
set S in X, f(t) is an element of t.
or
For any X without nul set, there
exists a choice function f with arguments domain t, such that for any t
belonging to X, f(t) belongs to t.
Good order: "x $ relation £ on x½ (x, £) G.O.
Zorn lemma:
Any inductive admits at least one
maximal element.
Inductive: an order (X, £) is inductive iff X ¹ Æ Ù any chain is majored
A chain is a totally ordered part by
£Ùc
Be (X, £) an inductive, we have to show that
there is a maximal element.
Let’s take f a choice fct. over Ãx \{Æ} (this parenthesis has not the same
meaning as that of set)
x0 = f(x)
either x0 is maximal and then, stop.
either x0 is not maximal, then strict Maj. {x0} ¹ Æ
xa: xa maximal? OK, stop!
If not, then
|
strict Maj. {xa} ¹ Æ Þ a + 1 = f(strict Maj. xa) |


A totally ordered chain x0 x1 xa a < g limit ordinal
{xb ½b < g limit}is an increased chain
to build
|
xg = f(strict Maj. {xb ½b < g}) |
a a xa F fct.
Defined by induction over On
2 possible cases:
a)
stop:
there exist a maximal
b)
no stop:
® f injective fct. We never have two a sent on the same point. On ® X set Now a fct. can never send a class on a
set: Ø$ F injective fct. proper class ® set
So the case b) is impossible.
Let’s show this:

|
We reverse the arrows. We build a
F-1. it will be functional since it is sufficient to say how it
works. F-1(z) = a Û (z Î image F Ù F(a) = z) Ú (z Ï image F Ù a = 0) So On is the image of F-1:
On = image F-1(X). So On must be a set by
virtue of axiom of replacement. But it is impossible since On
is a class. |
Conclusion: any chain is increased;
any inductive admits at least one maximal element.
Demo: 3 ® 2
|
X = {(A, £)|½ A Ì x Ù £ is a good order on A} |


X, £X is an inductive, and we have X, £X Iff A Ì B Ù £ is £’A
“ ’ ” in (B, £’) because the order is not the same as in (A, £)
what is needed is to see “where” the
chain goes, to build a raising element to the chain
|
(B, £’) ® Raising (Ai, £I) OK? Then,
Î X It is
to verify that Good Order are OK. |
Binary relations are seen as set of
couples.
By Zorn: $ (A*, £*) maximal in X, £X .
We would need a maximal part
different of whole X.
But then there is an external point x and we could build a really bigger Good Order!

If A* ¹ X, then (A*
{x}, £* followed by x) is
(A*, £*)!!
But A* is maximal, thus A* = X
Conclusion, A* = X and £* is a Good Order on X.
For any subset x of set y, there
exists
Hyper sets or non-well-founded sets:
$x (x = {x})
proofs implying the axiom choice are
non-constructive since they purport to demonstrate the existence of something
without saying how to construct it.
either x0 is maximal and then, stop.
either x0 is not maximal, then strict Maj. {x0} ¹ Æ
|
In mathematics, a function is a
relation such that each element of a set is associated with a unique element
of another (possibly the same) set. The concept of a function is fundamental
to virtually every branch of mathematics and every quantitative science. The terms function, mapping, map,
transformation and operator are usually used synonymously. |
Another formulation of the axiom of
choice (AC) states:
Given any set of mutually exclusive
non-empty sets, there exists at least one set that contains exactly one element
in common with each of the non-empty sets.
It seems obvious: if you've got a
bunch of boxes lying around with at least one item in each of them, the axiom
simply states that you can choose one item out of each box. Where's the
controversy?
Well, the controversy was over what
it meant to choose something from these sets. As an example, let us look at
some sample sets.

in which measure extensionality and
choice are in relation?
1. Let X be any finite collection of non-empty sets. : Then f can be stated explicitly (out of
set A choose a, ...), since the number of sets is finite. : Here the axiom of choice is not needed,
you can simply use the rules of formal logic. 2. Let X be the collection of all non-empty subsets of the
natural numbers {0, 1, 2, 3, ... }. :
Then f can be the function that chooses the smallest element in each set. : Again the axiom of choice is not needed,
since we have a rule for doing the choosing.
3. Let X be the collection of all sub-intervals of (0,1) with a length
greater than 0. : Then f can be the
function that chooses the midpoint of each interval. : Again the axiom of choice is not needed. 4. Let X be the collection of all
non-empty subsets of the reals. : Now
we have a problem. There is no obvious definition of f that will guarantee you
success, because the other axioms of ZF
The axioms are the result of work by
Thoralf Skolem in 1922, based on earlier work by Adolf Fraenkel in the same
year, which was based on the axiom system put forth by Ernst Zermelo in 1908
(Zermelo set theory).
The following set must exist, it
gathers parts of N:
{{0, 2}, {1, 3}, {4, 5}, {6, 7}, {8, 11}, {9, 13}, {10, 17}, {12, 19},
{14, 23}, {15, 29}, {16, 31}, {18, 37}, {20, 41},…}
it is countable since there is a
bijection: N x N ® N
the choice axiom says that it
functions but not “how” it functions.
(Zermelo set theory).
Cantor-Bernstein theorem
Let A and B be two
sets. If there exists a one-to-one function f from A to B
and another one-to-one function g from B to A, then card(A)
= card(B).
|
"A "B (f: A ® B « g: B ® A) Þ #A = #B |
or
|
"A "B (f: A ® B: inj. Ù g: B ® A: inj.) Þ #A = #B / h: A ® B: bij. |
A total order always contains a
co-final and well-ordered part, which means that any chain is raised/increased;
so we have an inductive set E, £
The choice axiom allows to
Contraposition:
two main cases of use:
-
-
when the conclusion to demonstrate
is divided in numerous cases and sub cases, which corresponds to several “OR”
between several propositions; then, it is better to start from the negation of
this conclusion that will then be written as a conjunction of several
propositions, i.e. with “AND” rather than “OR”.
Example: to show that if the
prime number p divides all the numbers

for k = 0 to n, either than p
divides all the ak either p divides all the bi.
Demonstration:
|
p divides
a0 b0; thus, p divides either a0 either b0
either both. p divides
a0 b1 + a1 b0; if p divides a0
and b0, this gives us no info; if p divides a0 only, then, it divides a1
too. p divides
a0 b2 + a1 b1 + a2 b0;
since p divides a0 and a1 and not b0, it
divides a2 too. p divides
a0 b3 + a1 b2 + a2 b1
+ a3 b0; since p divides a0, a1
and a2 and not b0, it divides a3 too. So we see
it is possible to continue the demo by subdividing at each step according to
the different cases, but it can become rather laborious. So a
contraposition demonstration seems to be judicious: If p
doesn’t divide all the ak nor all the bi, then there
exist a k such that p doesn’t divide Demonstration: If p
doesn’t divide all the ak, be r the first index such that p
doesn’t divide ar (thus p divide all the previous k); / p
divides a to ar-1 in the
same way, be s the first index such that p doesn’t divide bs; / p
divides b0 to bs-1 then, p
doesn’t divide a0 br+s… + ar bs +
… ar+s b0 since it divides all the terms but ar
bs. QED |
/ it is necessary that p divides at
least all the ak or all the bi since there is a pair, a
combination 2 by 2, of each ak with
bi
-
If a demonstration
doesn’t end in the direct sense or seems to be more and more complicated,
contraposition is often salutary too.
Example: to show that
|
("e > 0 | a | £ e) Þ a = 0 |
|
An
attempt of direct demonstration could consist to show that: | a | £ but we don’t
see how we can arrive to the conclusion a = 0; indeed, we cannot make a lead
to 0 since the result we intend to demonstrate is precisely that that will
all to justify such a passage to the limit! Let’s
take the contraposition: a ¹ 0 Þ $e > 0 | a | > e the
demonstration is direct: if we have a ¹ 0, we take e = |
Ab absurdo Demonstration:
Principle: to demonstrate A Þ B
We demonstrate A Þ Ø C and (A Ù Ø B) Þ C
If B was false, and nevertheless A
was true, we would deduce C;
now Ø C comes from A true; it is absurd
since we cannot have C and Ø C at the same time; hence the two
hypothesis A and Ø B are incompatible;
consequently, B comes obligatory
from A, in other words, A implies B, A Þ B.
Let’s show that
|
|
|
A º x² = 2 Ù x > 0 B º x Ï Q C º any rational is written A Þ B├─┤ x² = 2 Ù x > 0 Þ x Ï Q Let’s suppose
that x Î Q; then x = thus x² =
so 2 is a
prime factor of p² ; / indeed, 2 is a prime number but the prime
factor of p² are at an even power because it is a square, thus the power of 2
in p² is at least 2; thus
there is 2² in factor in 2q², thus there is 2 in factor in q²; which
causes that there is 2 in factor in q; bbut then
2 is a common factor to p and q, which is not possible given the choice of p
and q; thus the
demonstration is achieved by absurd. |
This is a true demonstration by
absurd.
A Þ (B Þ C) Schema:
Example:
|
A Ç B = B Þ B Ì A |
Even if not obvious, it is a sentence
of the type considered; indeed,
(A Ç B = B Þ B Ì A) º A Ç B = B Þ (x Î B) Þ (x Î A)
the demonstration must begin with
the middle sentence, i.e. here by x Î B; the validity of this way of
proceeding is justified by the rule that says that
A Þ (B Þ C) º B Þ (A Þ C)
First, let’s consider the
transformation of A Þ B into B Ú Ø A
|
Ø (A Þ B) º A Ù Ø B / as we can see in the
matrix below, the only case where the implication is false is when the
antecedent is true and the conclusion false. Ø (Ø (A Þ B)) º Ø (A Ù Ø B) (A Þ B) º Ø A Ú Ø (Ø B) A Þ B º Ø A Ú B A Þ B º B Ú Ø A |
|
p |
q |
p Ù q |
- (p Ù q) |
-p Ú -q |
p ® q |
|
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
|
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
|
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
|
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
If we come back to A Þ (B Þ C), we have
|
A Þ (B Þ C) º (B Þ C) Ú ØA º (C Ú Ø B) Ú ØA º C Ú Ø B Ú ØA º C Ú Ø (B Ù A) º (B Ù A) Þ C º B Þ (A Þ C) / by commutativity of (B Ù A) |
To demonstrate a sentence of the
type A Þ (B Þ C), it is simpler to start from the
middle proposition B and to use, in the process of the demonstration, the premise
A in order to come to the conclusion C. Contrary to what we could think at
first look, we don’t have to write A first!/ this would deserve a
demonstration!
So here, we have x Î B;
We use the premise that says: A Ç B = B
So we have x ÎA Ç B
Thus, x Î A
So we have x Î B Þ x Î A
Another example:
P divides q Þ qZ Ì pZ (nZ being the set of the multiple of n in Z)
q Þ qZ Ì pZ º x Î qZ, Þ x Î pZ,
We start from the middle sentence:
|
Be x Î qZ, then by definition, this means
that x is written qk; Now, p divides q Thus q = rp Thus x = rpk Consequently, x is a multiple of
p. |
/ q £ p because p contains all the
possible divisors, thus the prime numbers too, while q doesn't. But q can
contain 0 while p cannot!
About Í (inclusion in its extended meaning
as opposed to the strict inclusion Ì): this relation is:
-
reflexive: E
Í E
-
transitive:
E Í F Ù F Í G Þ E Í G
-
antisymmetrical:
E Í F Ù F Í E Û E = F / double inclusion method
È and Ç are dual notions
È ® Ç
" ® $
set Í set
element Î set
Linear diagrams:
|
Æ Í A Ç B Í A Í A È B Ù Æ Í A Ç B Í B Í A È B |

is the translation of the following
Euler Diagram:

|
A ∆ B = (A È B) - (A Ç B) |
|
A ∆ B |
Í |
A È B |
|
XOR (exclusive OR) |
|
OR (inclusive OR) |
Properties of the symmetrical
difference:
-
associativity:
A Δ (B Δ C) = (A Δ B) Δ C
-
neutral
element Æ: A Δ Æ = A / no common element to exclude
-
any
set is its own symmetric: A Δ A = Æ / all the elements are obviously common,
thus to be excluded
-
commutativity:
A Δ B = B Δ A
-
With these four properties, the
symmetrical difference is a law of commutative group over Ã(E) or Ã(E) fit with this law is a commutative group.
p Þ q
can be read:
-
-
p is a sufficient
condition for q
-
-
q is a necessary
condition for p
The sentence “this sentence is
false” is true if it is false!
Frege Peano Russell Zermelo Fraenkel
Zorn
Part of mathematics and of computer science (property)
Logic: classes, property ® Î (comprehension): if the element has
the property, it belongs to “class”
math: Î ®
sets if the element belongs to the “set”, it has the property extension
iterative conception of set belongs to the naïve set theory cardinality: extension of the notion of
equality
with Zermelo, a set is anything that
makes true an axiom
ordinal type of a well-ordered set.
Sets with the same ordinal type, in other words identical good orders, whose
respectives members are linked by an univocal relation respecting the order,
have the same ordinal type.
Null set extensionality (null set is
unique) pairs (to build bigger and bigger sets) infinite foundation parts
comprehension/separation scheme choice replacement scheme
Bouvier, Alain, La théorie des ensembles, Que sais-je, PUF, 1972
Falquet, G., University of Geneva
Gochet, Paul, Gribomont, Pascal, Logique, Hermès, 1994
Krivine, Jean-Louis, Théorie des ensembles, Cassini, 1998
Pichon, Jacques, Théorie des ensembles, Logique, Les Entiers, Ellipses, 1989
Hinnion, Roland, ZFC lessons, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2004
If “if” then “then”
ÛËÌ
If “if” then “then”
ÛËÌ
f: Æ ¾® {Æ}
(rough copy of loose ideas)
Time Travel, Logic and Speculation
(Noesis-e)
Time Travel, Logic and
Speculation II
(COJ)
2003 ã All rights reserved, CHRONOSCOPE â
total order
===========
http://www.brainyencyclopedia.com/encyclopedia/t/to/total_order.html
natural numbers
===============
http://www.brainyencyclopedia.com/encyclopedia/n/na/natural_number.html