Ty Hallmark
If events in history are inevitable, then why I am writing this paper? If things are going to happen, no matter what I say, than I am wasting my time and should be packing my bags for spring break. Unfortunately for myself and the beach that is waiting for me, I believe that historical events can be prevented, changed, or altered. So here I am, with only my laptop and twentieth-century mind to defend myself. The scariest thing about this entire undertaking is that I have to argue my cause against one of the leading scholars of all time. When I chose to discuss the Peloponnesian War, I did so out of curiosity. I was fairly unknowledgeable about the event and sought to increase my understanding by writing a paper on it. As I researched my topic, I realized that I was in big trouble. Not only was I having to labor over the writings of Thucydides, one of the leading Greek historians, but I was, to my absolute horror, in disagreement with him! It looks like it is going to be one of those David and Goliath type of days. I only hope that I have enough stones in my sling.
Thucydides has a huge advantage over me. He fought in the war. Thus, when he wrote his history, he explains, " I judged it proper not to narrate what I heard only by random report, but only such as I myself was present at." His first hand view gives him a detailed perspective, which I, fifteen hundred years later, am obviously lacking. Nevertheless, he states many times in his work that the strengthening of the Athenian Empire and the fear that it stirred in Sparta made the Peloponnesian War an inevitable fact. "The real but unavowed cause I consider to have been the growth of the power of Athens and the alarm that it inspired in Sparta; this made war inevitable." Several questions arise as we look at these two factors. Why was Athens becoming so powerful? Was anybody watching them and becoming wary? Was Sparta really as afraid as Thucydides implies?
Many contemporary scholars disagree on the answers to these questions and I dare say that they will remain puzzling for all time. However, some, like Donald Kagan, are willing to go out on a limb and examine these two ancient powers. In his detailed book, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, he comes to the conclusion that, "The imperial appetite of Athens was not insatiable and gave good evidence of being satisfied, the Spartans as a state seem not to have been unduly afraid of the Athenians. . . . and there was good reason to think that the two great powers and their allies could live side by side in peace indefinitely." Thucydides' perspective, Kagan says, does not follow true historical method. While Kagan does not believe Thucydides was deliberately deceptive, it is true that Thucydides was writing for people who knew much more about the war than today's readers. He often does not discuss both sides of an issue because his audience would already know them. However, "the canons of modern historical scholarship demand the presentation of a fair sample of the evidence. Evidence must be presented on both sides of an argument, and the interpretation must emerge from a demonstration that one thesis is better founded than another." Thus, when Thucydides explained the war as the sole product of Athens' imperial growth and Sparta's fearful response, I asked myself, "Was that all there was to it?"
The answer is no. Athens and Sparta are to blame for the war, however, they are not exclusively responsible. The great state of Corinth should also be included in the formula and though, "no one planned the Peloponnesian War, and no state wanted it. . . each of the three great states bears part of the blame for bringing it on."
Corinth, Athens and Sparta were all doing fine after they united together victoriously during the Persian War. They went on their separate ways afterward, with each state through their own methods becoming prosperous and successful. Athens reached the height of its glory during this time under the leadership of Pericles. After the Persian Wars, Athens seized the opportunity for an Empire by providing protection to the island states in the Aegean Sea. Using the funds given for that protection, "Pericles set about adorning Athens like a vain woman, draping around her neck precious stones and statues and temples." Even when the threat from the Persians no longer existed Athens still persuaded their contributors to keep sending money.
Athens became a vibrant city. Unlike some of the other states, the people of Athens did not hate each other and were able to "work out compromises resulting in the amalgamation of their state." Optimism and nationalism were abundant. Athens had a lot to take pride in. The trade and commerce of the Grecian States and the Mediterranean came into Piraeus, Athens' harbor, making the city a vivacious cultural center. Because they believed so strongly in their city, the Athenians were willing to fight for the stability of their institutions and "there can be little doubt that no people in history have been more tyrannical and cruel than the Athenians at certain moments." This passion to defend that which they held precious led them to make bad decisions when it came to dealing with other states. They acted, at times, aggressively and without cause to prove their willingness to battle for their city. They thought, like Pericles, that "we are alone among mankind in doing men benefits, not on calculations of self-interest, but in the fearless confidence of freedom." If these ideals were threatened, they fought without thinking.
This came out full force during the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians had agreed to align themselves alongside Corcyra, a Grecian colony facing serious attack from the Corinthians. The colony of Epidamnus, belonging to Corcyra, had recently been weakened due to feuds among its members and other colonies. The people of Epidamnus sent their officials into exile. They turned to Corcyra for help. When they were rejected, they turned to the Corinthians, a colony known for its bitter hatred of the Corcyreans. "Nothing compelled the Corinthians to intervene in Epidamnus when they knew that the intervention could mean war with Corcyra. No interest of theirs was threatened, no diminution of their power or prestige." Despite this, they gave Epidamnus the promise of their protection and it was at this point that Corinth became a leading factor in the outbreak of the war.
Corinth had seen its prestige sink as Athens and Sparta rose to power. The Corinthians were attempting to build a hegemony in the Grecian northwest to offset this loss of power. At the same time, Corcyra was rising in its dominion and had been known to add insult to injury by publicly making fun of Corinth. "This public insult inflamed the deep-seated hatred felt by the Corinthians and best explains their acceptance of the Epidamnian appeal." Basically their feelings were hurt and they wanted to prove themselves as a power house.
Upon hearing of this alliance, the Corcyreans attacked and won a brief skirmish on the seas. The Corinthians, "feeling indignant at this issue of the Cocyrean War made every preparation in their power for a naval armament drawing together mariners both from Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece." The Peloponnesian League included the state of Sparta, an obvious factor that would later bring them into the war. In an attempt to garner the same type of support, the Corcyreans went to Athens and pleaded for their help. Ironically, the Corinthians also traveled there to ask for the same thing. After a long debate ensued between the two colonies, Athens chose to support Corcyra only on the premise that Athenian ships were not to do any fighting unless the Corinthians attacked first. The Corinthians did. This forced Athens into a brief battle that would end quietly, but with many consequences.
The Athenian people began to feel threatened and instinctively acted to protect their precious city. "The policy of Pericles was to make Athens ready for war with Corinth but to avoid any step that might involve Sparta." They saw to it that their treasury could support them in wartime. Also during this time the Megarian Decree was passed by Pericles. Most likely a hostile act against the Peloponnesian ally, the decree barred "Megarians from the ports of the Athenian Empire and the market of Athens." Many scholars are confused why Pericles took this action when it was very likely going to spur the indignation of Sparta. Although several theories have been concocted, I believe that this was a simple way for Athens to tell the League they were not fooling around. Though they did not want to, they were ready and prepared to go to war. Most likely, the policy was not intended to evoke war, just warn of things to come. Pericles was playing it safe. Though the policy might arouse Spartan curiosity there was "yet no interest vital to Sparta [that] had been touched." Pericles did not see a war with Sparta as inevitable.
The next act that Athens took was undoubtedly even more rash than the Megarian Decree. In 433 B.C. Athens delivered an ultimatum to Potidaea, a group of people living on the isthmus in northeastern Greece. They ordered the people to take down their city walls and force all Corinthians out. The Potideans refused to comply, and, as a result got involved in a rebellion that finally brought Sparta into the war. The Potidean Ultimatum was again an act of defiance against Corinth and a warning to all other states that Athens was ready for war. However, this decree probably did more to agitate people into battle than any preceding it. To the Spartans this edict, added to their previous ones, "must have seemed the acts of a tyrannous, aggressive, and dangerous state."
The rebellion that ensued from this ultimatum again showed that Pericles did not think war was inevitable. He was not prepared to suppress a rebellion and had to call on a number of allies to help in laying siege to the city. If he had really expected a full fledged war he would have avoided the conflict at Potidea. It "took a large army from home and kept it engaged for over two years." In addition, this rebellion took vast amounts of money away from the Athenian treasury. As a final consequence, it "could be used by enemies to paint a picture of a state that had become arrogant, aggressive, and a threat to the liberty of all Greeks as well as the security of Sparta." Up to this point Sparta had been more or less aloof of Athenian action. Now they were being warned by their war party to take notice and fear the empire. In 432 Sparta took action and declared war on Athens.
Urged on by its allies, Sparta acted too quickly. If they had looked closer at the activities of the Athenians they would not have reacted so rashly. Athens had made no territorial acquisitions since the days of the Persians Wars in the 480s. In taking preparatory action for war with Corinth, Athens was not doing anything that Sparta had not done in its protective moves from Persia. Sparta was listening to the talk of Corinth and other allies in the Peloponnesian League who were eager to have Sparta back them in their cause against Athens. This was their downfall and the reason why they are partially to blame for the war. They "allowed their war party to frighten them with unfounded alarms of Athenian vision." They were captured by the "romantic vision" of destroying Athenian imperialism and "restoring Sparta to unchallenged supremacy."
All of the major city-states made decisions that were emotional and not entirely thought out. All of them jumped to conclusions without thinking of the consequences. None of them imagined the great war that would come about due to their error. They might have predicted a short skirmish, but not the twenty-seven years it took to end the conflict. None of them thought that war was inevitable. How could they? If the United States thought a major nuclear war would come about with Iraq, they would think twice about doing air strikes in that area. Most likely though, the President does not see that as an inevitable event in the course of history. Neither do I. I think that, with the proper foresight and precautionary measures, such catastrophes can be headed off.
The Peloponnesian war was not caused by villains who were out to destroy the world. This is not to say that none of the statesmen involved had selfish intentions in mind. The war was also not caused by one state, but several who acted impulsively. Finally, "the Peloponnesian War was not caused by impersonal forces, unless anger, fear, undue optimism, stubbornness, jealousy, bad judgement, and lack of foresight are impersonal causes. It was caused by men who made bad decisions in difficult circumstances. Neither the circumstances nor the decisions were inevitable." So there, Thuycdides!
Bailkey, Nels M. Readings in Ancient History: Thought and Experience from Gilgamesh To St. Augustine. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1996.
Kagan, Donald. The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. London: Cornell University Press, 1969.
Thucydides. The History of Thucydides. Trans. Rev. S.T. Bloomfield. London: Longman, Rees, Brown, and Green, 1929.
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